Blog details

25 Sep

A New Xenomorph Campaign

Anyone familiar with the famous movie “Alien”, directed by Ridley Scott in 1979, is well aware of how hard it is to get rid of the titular monsters of this franchise. Despite all the efforts from the protagonists, the monsters seem to always return.

When we discovered and named Xenomorph, in February 2022, we would never have been able to predict how similar this malware family could be to its cinematic counterpart.

Back in August 2023 ThreatFabric’s cyber fraud analysts once again came across some new samples of Xenomorph.

From what was observed in previous cases, we were able to clearly identify a distribution campaign, using phishing webpages to trick victims into installing malicious APKs, which feature a larger list of targets compared to its previous versions.

This new list adds dozens of new overlays for institutions from the United States, Portugal, and multiple crypto wallets, following a trend that has been consistent amongst all banking malware families in the last year.

ThreatFabric was also able to analyse an ongoing campaign, with thousands of downloads of Xenomorph in Spain and the United States.

This is not unusual as many other malware families have started expanding their area of interest across the Atlantic Ocean, including the most distributed MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service) families, such as Octo, Hydra, and Hook, and some of the most notorious privately operated families, such as Anatsa.

Slide5-2

As a consequence to the Device Take-Over capabilities offered by these families, it is now easier than ever for criminals to move across different markets and perform fraud with little or no infrastructure required.

In this article, we will cover our latest research on Xenomorph, starting from a technical point of view, as well as address the distribution framework used by the Threat Actors behind this campaign, and its connections to other malware families, as well as Windows Desktop malware distributed side-by-side with it.

Xenomorph is Back Once Again

Xenomorph is a very advanced malware family, which runs the gamut from simple SMS manipulation to full device control, due to a very powerful Automated Transfer System (ATS) framework obtained via Remote Access capabilities offered by accessibility services privileges. This malware family has been in constant evolution since its discovery in early 2022, adding continuous features over the months.

Xenomorph uses overlays as its main way to obtain Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as usernames, passwords, credit card numbers, and much more. The control server transmits to the bot a list of URLs containing the address from which the malware can retrieve the overlays for the infected device.

Such overlays are encrypted using a combination of an algorithm specific to Xenomorph and AES. Once decrypted, the overlay poses as login pages for the targeted applications:

Slide6-1

Its main feature is the very flexible ATS Engine, which offers a vast quantity of actions that can be used and chained into sequences of operations, triggered when specific conditions are met. Threat Actors refer to these sets of actions as “modules” of their engine. The malware contains in its configuration a large set of modules, which mostly offer possibilities to manipulate the infected device’s settings, for example by granting write permission to the malware or disabling Doze mode (a mode that conserves battery by restricting apps’ access to network and CPU-intensive services).

The list of modules available in the malware’s hardcoded and encrypted configuration is very similar to the previous variant of Xenomorph that we reported earlier this year. In this version, a new module was added, which is highlighted in bold in the table below:

Module name description  

notificationAccess

Grant notification access

 

grantPermissions

Automatically grants itself all permissions required

 

dozeModeDisableTypeA

Disable Doze mode (Xiaomi MIUI) version 1

 

dozeModeDisableTypeB

Disable Doze mode (Xiaomi MIUI) version 2

 

dozeModeDisableTypeC

Disable Doze mode (Xiaomi MIUI) version 3

 

dozeModeDisableTypeD

Disable Doze mode (Xiaomi MIUI) version 4

 

disablePlayProtect

Disable Play Protect

 

xiaomiAdminAccess

Get Admin Access Xiaomi

 

restrictUninstall_SamsungApi29

Stop uninstall procedure in Samsung using API 29 (Android 10)

 

dismissSettingsAlerts_Generic

Dismiss Settings Alerts

 

restrictReset_Generic

Stop device reset

 

restrictReset_ByContentVid_SamsungApi30

Stop device reset in Samsung using API 30 (Android 11)

 

restrictUninstall_ByClassName

Stop uninstall procedure based on Class name

 

restrictUninstall_Generic

Stop uninstall procedure

 

restrictAccessibilityDisable_Generic

Stop disabling of Accessibility Services privileges

 

restrictAdminRetrieve_XiaomiApi30

Restrict retrieving Admin in Xiaomi using API 30 (Android 11)

 

restrictSettingsClicks_Generic

Restrict clicks in settings

 

defaultSmsApp-Alert

Interface with Default SMS settings Alert

 

defaultSmsApp-Role-ChangePrevention

Prevent removal of Default SMS Role

 

defaultSmsApp-Role

Obtain Default SMS role

 

defaultSmsApp-Settings

Set as Default SMS Handler

 

grantWriteStoragePermissions

Grants write storage permissions

 

grantSystemWritePermissions

Grants system write permissions

 

getGoogle2FA

Gets Google Authenticator 2FA codes

 

The list includes multiple modules dedicated to precise actions for specific Mobile User Interfaces based on AOSP (Android Open Source Project), for example MIUI in the case of Xiaomi or One UI in the case of Samsung. This is necessary because different UIs require a unique order of operations to perform specific actions, like disabling Doze mode.

Actors have put a lot of effort into modules that support Samsung and Xiaomi devices. This makes sense, considering that these two combined make up roughly 50% of the whole Android market share, according to recent data presented in multiple recent studies.

These modules are built in the same way we discussed in our previous blog, but we will report here the structure for convenience. Each module is saved in JSON format, with multiple entries, structured in the following way:

{
  "module": "<MODULE_NAME>",
  "version": 1,
  "parameters": [...], // LIST OF PARAMETERS
  "requires": [...], // LIST OF REQUIRED CONDITIONS
  "triggerConditions": [...], // LIST OF TRIGGER CONDITIONS
  "terminator": {...}, // IS TERMINATOR ENABLED
  "operations": [...] // LIST OF OPERATIONS TO BE EXECUTED (ATS)
}

This system gives criminals the building blocks required to recreate the flow of a decision algorithm. This means that the ATS modules are not simply a list of actions to execute one after the other: with the to the “triggerConditions”, “requires”, and “terminator” parameters, the ATS engine is capable of performing conditional checks and loops, vastly increasing its flexibility.

The full list of operations that can be used in this engine is quite extensive but has not been modified from Xenomorph’s previous version. If you are interested in this list, which includes actions to press specific buttons, perform global actions (Home screen, Back, etc.), and search for specific text in the UI, you can refer to our previous article regarding this malware family.

 

New Capabilities

From a purely technical point of view, this new campaign of Xenomorph does not feature major modifications from its previous iteration. This is a testament to the maturity of this Android Banker. Most of the work from the Threat Actors operating Xenomorph is going into developing additional ATS modules, and most importantly distributing their product.

This does not mean that the malware is completely identical to its predecessor.

Here is a list of new commands added by Xenomorph (the full list is available in the Appendix of this article):

Command Description

start_mimic

Start Mimic Function

stop_mimic

Stop Mimic Function

show_push (antisleep feature)

Enable antisleep push notification

clickOnPoint

simulate a touch on specific coordinates

Antisleep Feature

This feature allows criminals to set a flag in the shared preferences file, which tells the malware that the device should not go into sleep mode (i.e., the screen should never turn off).

Whenever the flag “antisleep” is set, the malware maintains an active notification, which keeps the device awake, preventing it from going to sleep.

The code is contained in the logic of the command “show_push”, responsible for displaying push notifications.

If the “antisleep” tag exists and is set to true, then the malware will create a default push notification. If it is set to false it will clear it, allowing the device to go back to sleep.

If the malware wants to push a customised notification, then it will delete the flag altogether and will receive from the C2 the parameters required to create such a notification.

‘Mimic’ Feature

Threat Actors have also added a new feature, referred to as “mimic” in the code.

This feature is enabled or disabled using the “start_mimic” and “stop_mimic”.

Effectively, whenever the malware is launched, it checks if this mimic mode is active. If it is, it will automatically launch another activity that was communicated as a parameter with the start_mimic command. This gives the option to the malware to act as any other application, and more importantly, removes one behaviour that is often associated with malware. The code contains an activity called IDLEActivity, which is used as a webView to display a legitimate website.

Slide7

In most cases, after the first execution, malware hides its icon from the launcher, in order to pass unnoticed for the longest time possible. However, this is also something that can be checked by security products, and it increases the risk score associated with a specific application. 

By posing as another application, Xenomorph can avoid using this technique, avoiding triggering one of the many behaviours typical of Android malware.

In the samples observed the code for this feature is available, but it is manually disabled with a hardcoded flag. We expect this to change in the near future.

ClickOnPoint Feature

Finally, the last command added by the authors or Xenomorph is the ability to simulate a simple touch at specified coordinates, using the “clickOnPoint” command.

This is not an incredibly advanced feature, and definitely not the most complex that Xenomorph offers, however, it allows criminals to perform small actions without having to create a full ATS module.

This command adds more flexibility to the whole process:

if (!apiCommand0.command.equals("clickOnPoint") ||
     apiCommand0.parameters == null ||
     ((String)apiCommand0.parameters.get("x")) == null ||
     ((String)apiCommand0.parameters.get("y")) == null) {
          continue;
}
Integer integer0 = Integer.parseInt(((String)apiCommand0.parameters.get("x")));
Integer integer1 = Integer.parseInt(((String)apiCommand0.parameters.get("y")));
UtilAccessibility.click(App.getAccessibilityService(), integer0.intValue(), integer1.intValue());

Target Analysis

 

Overlays

The most recent samples of this new Xenomorph campaign date back to mid-August 2023, and were identified by the appTag “RUN-AUG1508-HIDE-1”. This tag, apart from helping us identify the period of activity connected with this specific campaign, also indicates the likelihood of a recurrence of such activity.

We were able to identify a few dozen samples belonging to this campaign, connected with a targeted effort in the same areas we identified in what we defined as a “live campaign” in our previous article.

These areas include Spain, Portugal, Italy, Canada, and Belgium.

However, this latest campaign also added plenty of financial institutions from the United States, together with multiple crypto-wallet applications, totaling more than 100 different targets per sample, each one using a specifically crafted overlay to steal precious PII from the victim’s infected device.

TF_XenomorphCampaign

As mentioned in the introduction, this is a trend that we consistently observe in all modern malware families.

With the ubiquity of mobile banking adoption from institutions from all over the world, it is only logical that criminals are taking this opportunity to expand their activity to previously untapped markets.

Distribution

ThreatFabric was able to identify active campaigns distributing the malware via phishing pages. In these cases, the malware was distributed through phishing pages posing as a Chrome update.

This is in line with the standard lures used by many other malware families: usually with applications that are very common and generic, like Google Chrome browser or Google Play store, raise fewer suspicions among victims, who are extremely likely to have them already installed on their device. 

In this specific case, however, actors made the vital mistake of not restricting access to the server folder containing the files necessary to distribute the malware (not a first when it comes to Xenomorph).

This allowed us to monitor the server, identifying multiple interesting files.

One of them is named count.txt, and contains a list of entries, made up of IPs, user agents, and dates. Upon further investigation, we were able to confirm that these were the IPs of devices downloading the payload of the phishing page.

This gave us very valuable information about the actual downloads of this Xenomorph campaign.

Slide4-2

From the graph, it is clear that this campaign is heavily focused on Spain, with more than 3,000 downloads in the span of a few weeks, followed by a large margin of downloads from the United States and Portugal, with more than 100 downloads each.

It is worth noting that, a few days before the publishing of this article, the drop point change payload, started distributing ExobotCompact/Octo. 

The reason behind this event could be one of the following:

  • The server is used by one actor, using multiple threats, testing each one.
  • The server is part of a distribution service, where the samples to be distributed are handed over to distributor which places them on one server for different campaigns of different operators.

Both cases are possible, and we have actually reported instances of each in the past. The first case is still connected to Xenomorph, being distributed side-by-side with Ermac payloads using Zombinder droppers.

The second case dates back to 2022, with the same infrastructure distributing both Medusa and Cabassous.

Currently, we do not have conslusive evidence to prove either of these hypothesis, but we will continue to monitor the infrastructure to gain more information.

Desktops are also Targeted

However, other files also caught our analysts’ attention: further analysis of the files revealed that they are related to several quite well-known Desktop stealersmalware designed to steal credentials from victims’ machines.

Slide1-1

In the following sections we cover two interesting files: “phoneoutsourcing.exe” related to RisePro stealer and “647887023.png” being one of the stages leading to infection with LummaC2 stealer.

Stealer on the Rise: RisePro stealer with Private Loader traces

RisePro stealer is a well-known credential stealer within the desktop malware threat landscape. It is also known to have certain connections to other prominent malware families: Private Loader, as reported by Sekoia.io. is another example of Malware-as-a-Service advertised on underground forums.

First discovered in December 2022, RisePro remained quiet for some time, coming back again in July 2023. This time several advertisements were placed in underground forums promoting the renewed service.

Slide2-1

The capabilities of the stealer are rather wide, including:

  • Stealing of credentials, credit cards, and cookies from a wide range of browsers and browser extensions;
  • Credentials from software, including cryptocurrency wallets and e-mail clients;
  • File grabbing by name pattern;
  • Arbitrary file downloading.

Monitoring of RisePro developer accounts showed that the malware receives constant updates and enhancements. The analysis of the file discovered on the distribution website showed that it is indeed RisePro stealer, with traces leading to another popular malware family Private Loader.

However, a previously undocumented change was discovered in this malware: the communication protocol with C2 was updated and instead of HTTP it uses raw TCP sockets over port 50500 to receive commands and exfiltrate data.

Slide3-1

The structure of the packet is as follows:

  • Header “xadxdaxbaxab”  (DWORD)
  • Size of the encrypted data (DWORD)
  • Packet/command ID (DWORD)
  • Encrypted data

The data is encrypted with the same substitution table and XOR key as described in the Sekoia.io blog, after decryption the JSON structure with configurations is retrieved:

Slide4-1

The analysis of the C2 reveals the login panel of RisePro stealer, once again proving the relation:

Slide5-1

 

LummaC2 is also here

The nature of the files found on the distribution server shows that it is very likely a part of a distribution service that might be used by multiple actors. However, there is also a possibility that all these files belong to one actor who is trying several Malware-as-a-Service “providers” to test them and see the outcome, focusing not only on mobile devices but also desktops, trying to reach a wider audience and grab as many credentials as possible.

Further analysis of the host on VirusTotal revealed a connection to ZIP archive called “BrowserUpdate.zip” (similar to masquerading by Xenomorph and Octo) which was seen contacting the server and downloading one of the “PNG” files. Further examination of the files revealed its connection to another well-known stealer, LummaC2.

Slide6

Its functionality is not significantly different from other stealers, aiming to steal huge amounts of credentials and sensitive data from victims’ machines.

There is such a variety of malicious tools found on one server that we can conclude with much confidence that actors behind it test different Malware-as-a-Service to find out the most profitable ones.

Conclusion

This investigation once again highlights the continuous efforts of criminals to perfect their products and expand their reach, in order to maximize their profits.

Xenomorph, after months of hiatus, is back, and this time with distribution campaigns targeting some regions that have been historically of interest for this family, like Spain or Canada, and adding a large list of targets from the United States, as well as multiple new Cryptowallets.

ThreatFabric was able to analyse one specific campaign, connecting it with thousands of downloads predominantly from Spain, followed by the United States and other European major countries.

Xenomorph maintains its status as an extremely dangerous Android Banking malware, featuring a very versatile and powerful ATS engine, with multiple modules already created, with the idea of supporting multiple manufacturer’s devices.

The fact that we saw Xenomorph being distributed side-by-side with powerful desktop stealers is very interesting news. It could indicate a connection between the threat actors behind each of these malware, or it could mean that Xenomorph is being officially sold as a MaaS to actors, who operate it together with other malware families. In each case, it indicates an activity from Xenomorph which we have not seen before, but which we might see a lot of in the near future. 

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Appendix

Xenomorph Samples

Hash (sha256) App name package name
e2646afca109162f66b117ca8a7feed0272ab6d8822132dafd2d54d7553cbfde Chrome com.peace.frequent
259e88f593a3df5cf14924eec084d904877953c4a78ed4a2bc9660a2eaabb20b Chrome com.mtnyrvojt.qtbxtwjnq
257f041d1b6ed82808cd8ef07ec84cf141c38e5374b654de46879a3bc180c79c Chrome com.uhtvqsutg.igogiciut

Xenomorph C2 servers

Server url/ip Role
airlinesimulator[.]io Overlay Server
fobocontentplus[.]online C2 Server
fobocontentplus[.]top C2 Server
fobocontentplus[.]site C2 Server
92l[.]info Phishing Server

Xenomorph Targets

Highlighted in bold are the newly added targets:

package name app name country

com.ally.MobileBanking

Ally Mobile

United States

com.americanexpress.android.acctsvcs.us

Amex

United States

com.aol.mobile.aolapp

AOL – News, Mail & Video

United States

com.att.myWireless

myAT&T

United States

com.bancorpsouth.android

BancorpSouth Mobile

United States

com.bbt.myfi

U by BB&T

United States

com.botw.mobilebanking

Bank of the West Mobile

United States

com.chase.sig.android

Chase Mobile

United States

com.citi.citimobile

Citi Mobile®

United States

com.citizensbank.androidapp

Citizens Bank Mobile Banking

United States

com.compasssavingsbank.mobile

Compass Savings Bank

United States

com.discoverfinancial.mobile

Discover Mobile

United States

com.etrade.mobilepro.activity

E*TRADE: Invest. Trade. Save.

United States

com.huntington.m

Huntington Mobile

United States

com.infonow.bofa

Bank of America Mobile Banking

United States

com.konylabs.capitalone

Capital One® Mobile

United States

com.mcom.firstcitizens

First Citizens Mobile Banking

United States

com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_136

People’s United Bank Mobile

United States

com.morganstanley.clientmobile.prod

Morgan Stanley Wealth Mgmt

United States

com.mtb.mbanking.sc.retail.prod

M&T Mobile Banking

United States

com.navyfederal.android

Navy Federal Credit Union

United States

com.pnc.ecommerce.mobile

PNC Mobile

United States

com.schwab.mobile

Schwab Mobile

United States

com.sovereign.santander

Santander Bank US

United States

com.suntrust.mobilebanking

SunTrust Mobile App

United States

com.tdbank

TD Bank (US)

United States

com.truist.mobile

Truist Mobile – Banking Made Better

United States

com.usaa.mobile.android.usaa

USAA Mobile

United States

com.usbank.mobilebanking

U.S. Bank – Inspired by customers

United States

com.wf.wellsfargomobile

Wells Fargo Mobile

United States

com.woodforest

Woodforest Mobile Banking

United States

com.zellepay.zelle

Zelle

United States

es.liberbank.cajasturapp

Banca Digital Liberbank

United States

org.ncsecu.mobile

SECU

United States

com.key.android

KeyBank Mobile

United States

com.regions.mobbanking

Regions Bank

United States

com.clairmail.fth

Fifth Third Mobile Banking

United States

com.plunien.poloniex

Poloniex Crypto Exchange

Crypto

com.wallet.crypto.trustapp

Trust: Crypto & Bitcoin Wallet

Crypto

com.binance.dev

Binance – Buy & Sell Bitcoin Securely

Crypto

com.coinbase.android

Coinbase – Buy & Sell Bitcoin. Crypto Wallet

Crypto

com.kraken.trade

Pro: Advanced Bitcoin & Crypto Trading

Crypto

io.metamask

MetaMask – Buy, Send and Swap Crypto

Crypto

net.bitbay.bitcoin

Bitcoin & Crypto Exchange – BitBay

Crypto

net.bitstamp.app

Bitstamp – Buy & Sell Bitcoin at Crypto Exchange

Crypto

piuk.blockchain.android

Blockchain Wallet. Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum

Crypto

com.latuabancaperandroid

Intesa Sanpaolo Mobile

Italy

com.lynxspa.bancopopolare

YouApp

Italy

com.sella.BancaSella

Banca Sella

Italy

it.bcc.iccrea.mycartabcc

myCartaBCC

Italy

it.bnl.apps.banking

BNL

Italy

it.carige

Carige Mobile

Italy

it.copergmps.rt.pf.android.sp.bmps

Banca MPS

Italy

it.creval.bancaperta

Bancaperta

Italy

it.nogood.container

UBI Banca

Italy

it.popso.SCRIGNOapp

SCRIGNOapp

Italy

posteitaliane.posteapp.appbpol

BancoPosta

Italy

posteitaliane.posteapp.apppostepay

Postepay

Italy

ca.mobile.explorer

CA Mobile

Portugal

cgd.pt.caixadirectaparticulares

Caixadirecta

Portugal

com.abanca.bm.pt

ABANCA – Portugal

Portugal

com.bbva.mobile.pt

BBVA Portugal

Portugal

com.exictos.mbanka.bic

Banco BIC, SA

Portugal

pt.bancobpi.mobile.fiabilizacao

BPI APP

Portugal

pt.novobanco.nbapp

NB smart app

Portugal

pt.santandertotta.mobileparticulares

Santander Particulares

Portugal

pt.sibs.android.mbway

MB WAY

Portugal

wit.android.bcpBankingApp.activoBank

ActivoBank

Portugal

wit.android.bcpBankingApp.millennium

Millenniumbcp

Portugal

app.wizink.es

WiZink, tu banco senZillo

Spain

com.bankinter.launcher

Bankinter Móvil

Spain

com.bbva.bbvacontigo

BBVA Spain

Spain

com.cajasur.android

Cajasur

Spain

com.db.pbc.mibanco

Mi Banco db

Spain

com.grupocajamar.wefferent

Grupo Cajamar

Spain

com.imaginbank.app

imaginBank – Your mobile bank

Spain

com.indra.itecban.mobile.novobanco

NBapp Spain

Spain

com.indra.itecban.triodosbank.mobile.banking

Triodos Bank. Banca Móvil

Spain

com.mediolanum

Banco Mediolanum España

Spain

com.rsi

ruralvía

Spain

com.targoes_prod.bad

TARGOBANK – Banca a distancia

Spain

com.tecnocom.cajalaboral

Banca Móvil Laboral Kutxa

Spain

es.bancosantander.apps

Santander

Spain

es.caixagalicia.activamovil

ABANCA- Banca Móvil

Spain

es.caixaontinyent.caixaontinyentapp

Caixa Ontinyent

Spain

es.cecabank.ealia2103appstore

UniPay Unicaja

Spain

es.cm.android

Bankia

Spain

es.evobanco.bancamovil

EVO Banco móvil

Spain

es.ibercaja.ibercajaapp

Ibercaja

Spain

es.lacaixa.mobile.android.newwapicon

CaixaBank

Spain

es.openbank.mobile

Openbank – banca móvil

Spain

es.pibank.customers

Pibank

Spain

es.univia.unicajamovil

UnicajaMovil

Spain

www.ingdirect.nativeframe

ING España. Banca Móvil

Spain

be.argenta.bankieren

Argenta Banking

Belgium

be.axa.mobilebanking

Mobile Banking Service

Belgium

be.belfius.directmobile.android

Belfius Mobile

Belgium

com.bnpp.easybanking

Easy Banking App

Belgium

com.ing.banking

ING Banking

Belgium

com.kbc.mobile.android.phone.kbc

KBC Mobile

Belgium

ca.affinitycu.mobile

Affinity Mobile

Canada

ca.bnc.android

National Bank of Canada

Canada

ca.hsbc.hsbccanada

HSBC Canada

Canada

ca.manulife.MobileGBRS

Manulife Mobile

Canada

ca.motusbank.mapp

motusbank mobile banking

Canada

ca.pcfinancial.bank

PC Financial Mobile

Canada

ca.servus.mbanking

Servus Mobile Banking

Canada

ca.tangerine.clients.banking.app

Tangerine Mobile Banking

Canada

com.atb.ATBMobile

ATB Personal – Mobile Banking

Canada

com.cibc.android.mobi

CIBC Mobile Banking®

Canada

com.coastcapitalsavings.dcu

Coast Capital Savings

Canada

com.desjardins.mobile

Desjardins mobile services

Canada

com.eqbank.eqbank

EQ Bank Mobile Banking

Canada

com.meridian.android

Meridian Mobile Banking

Canada

com.pcfinancial.mobile

Simplii Financial

Canada

com.rbc.mobile.android

RBC Mobile

Canada

com.shaketh

Shakepay: Buy Bitcoin Canada

Canada

com.td

TD Canada

Canada

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